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Book Reviews
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY REAPPRAISED
Robin May Schott
Discovering Feminist Philosophy: Knowledge, Ethics and Politics
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, 157 pp., ISBN 0–7425–1455–2
Herta Nagl-Docekal
Feminist Philosophy, trans. Katharina Vester
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004, 250 pp., ISBN 0–8133–6571–6
The appearance of two new introductory texts on feminist philosophy is to be
greatly welcomed, both for their resolution in taking on the subject as a whole, and
in providing the opportunity to compare the different approaches employed by two
respected ‘European’ academics. Robin May Schott is US trained but now living and
working in Copenhagen, while Herta Nagl-Docekal – whose book is translated from
German – is a professor at Vienna University. As such, both are fully open to the
European tradition of modernist philosophy and draw widely on sources to which
native English speakers may have little access. As my own interests have been very
largely within the field of recent continental philosophy – represented by feminists
such as Luce Irigaray – and the Anglo-American take on poststructuralism – in
which Judith Butler is exemplary, I was intrigued to see how both authors would
appeal to my concerns. Moreover, given that like many feminist academics exposed
to the full interdisciplinarity of women’s studies, I would hesitate to define myself
as a philosopher per se, the question of how philosophy shapes and interacts with
broader issues was always in the forefront of my reading.
While feminists generally have little difficulty in rejecting the familiar claim that
philosophy is the master discourse that grounds all subsequent intellectual
endeavour, that is not to say that some understanding of how philosophy works
and what it addresses is not an essential component of gender politics. Both Schott
and Nagl-Docekal are rightly committed to the affective power of their discipline
without being blinkered about either the anti-women claims made on its behalf,
or its propensity to overlook the feminine altogether. Indeed, as Schott’s subtitle
indicates, philosophy is never detached from politics, and both books are careful
to bring out the intersections characteristic of feminist thinking and activism.
Although the two works may be primarily directed towards philosophy students
– including, one hopes, those who have little sympathy with or understanding of
feminism – their appeal as specifically feminist texts must engage a wider audience
of feminist scholars seeking an overview on what might justify the study of phil-
osophy. The task for the authors, then, is to maintain a sufficient level of analytic
sophistication to satisfy the most sceptical student of philosophy, while remaining
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accessible to those without prior experience of the discipline. Does it work? My
quick response is yes, the appeal and potential of feminist philosophy is effec-
tively explored and will provoke further reflection, but that neither work truly
excited me as many women’s studies texts have done. One difficulty is that where
other work may reasonably get away with some degree of rhetorical gesture, phil-
osophy – if it is to be taken seriously – is constrained to be much more careful in
structuring its central arguments. I do not mean that a slavish rationality is necess-
arily demanded – though Nagl-Docekal has much to say in rationality’s defence
– but that there is a need for a certain form of coherence. As I detail below, the two
books are variably successful in maintaining an appealing momentum.
In Discovering Feminist Philosophy, Robin May Schott addresses head-on what
she perceives as an active hostility to, or prejudice against, her subject. As a
migrant outsider, she is all too aware of the gap between the strong representation
of women in formal political structures in Denmark, and their struggle to maintain
a professional footing in the academy. As with other countries, the situation vis-
a-vis philosophy is particularly acute – bleak, says Schott – but she turns it to her
advantage by insisting that ‘an outsider status can generate key philosophical
questions’ (p. 4). She rapidly outlines the substantive indicators through which it
is clear that far from having now achieved equality, women remain subject to
oppression, violence and discrimination worldwide, and she firmly establishes the
credentials of feminist philosophy in tackling such political realities. In incorpor-
ating some autobiographical material into her account, Schott not only offers an
easy mode of access to her material, but performatively demonstrates the feminist
aversion to the privileged (though always unrealized) impartiality of mainstream
philosophy. Her strategy of recalling the hostile occasion of a mixed philosophy
seminar in order to introduce a set of familiar objections to feminist philosophy,
and her own counter-responses, works extremely well. Schott is enabled to lay out
and defend some central tenets of the feminist position including the significance
of a non-essentialist understanding of sexual difference; the relation between
masculinity and rationality; the effects of power, and the relations between norms
and social reality; the problematization of universality; and the importance of
recognizing that philosophy can be both strategic and substantive. And as she sees
it, a fully constituted feminist philosophy should always relate to bodies marked
by sex.
For Schott, the achievements of feminist interventions in the field can best be
understood in the context of the three related themes of the history of philosophy;
theories of knowledge; and ethics (p. 21). With regard to the first, feminism is
deeply concerned to uncover a history of sexism that permeates philosophy from
the earliest work, and Schott lucidly articulates some core objections to Kant –
among others – as the philosopher who has most outraged feminists. His
notorious assertion, ‘I hardly believe the fair sex is capable of principles’, is hard
to dismiss, and Schott duly remarks that his philosophy ‘illustrates an ascetic
posture that is based on a distancing from and denigration of feeling, sensuality
and the feminine’ (p. 39). Nonetheless, she does not wholly condemn Kant and
generously references, albeit with reservations, the many feminist philosophers –
including Nagl-Docekal – who would reclaim his work as essential to the feminist
project. Indeed, the purpose of Schott’s meticulous attention to the gaps and
contradictions of philosophical history is not to expose its worthlessness, but to
insist on the value for philosophy as a whole of recognizing what is ‘unknown and
unthought’ (p. 29). Against the view that philosophy can be all-inclusive and
complete, Schott believes that it is only in questioning such assumptions that we
are pushed to the borders of thought. Alert readers will detect here not just a
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concern with the missing gender dimension, but a move towards an altogether
more postmodernist understanding of what philosophy can and cannot achieve.
It is not that Schott ever comes out as a postmodernist as such, but that she is fully
alert to the significances of the instabilities that are threaded through the main-
stream history. For feminists, it is not a matter of resolving those instabilities, but
of appreciating the value of producing multiple interpretations that make no claim
to finality. As Schott puts it: ‘it is in the spirit of living in the present critically that
feminist readers open up places for innovative readings, dissenting views, and
maverick approaches’ (p. 47).
Moving on to epistemology, Schott picks up that idea with reference to the
perspectivism of the arch maverick Nietzsche, whose work has found an increas-
ing place in feminist philosophy. But, she asks, if knowledge is always situated,
then how should we understand the philosophical attempt to transcend the
particular context (p. 54)? As is obligatory on such occasions – and how one longs
for a wholly iconoclastic defiance here – Schott makes the ritual denial of rela-
tivism, as well as of any essentialist connotations of the phrase ‘women’s ways of
knowing’. Her explanation of the differences between feminist and traditional
epistemology is careful and thorough, and clearly shows why the situatedness of
gender is by no means the only issue at hand. The feminist attention to questions
of community, power and desire does not so much undermine the notions of truth
and reason so dear to the Enlightenment as contextualize them sociohistorically.
In short, for Schott, knowledge always implies a ‘social enterprise’ (p. 55).
Similarly, ‘knowing another person is . . . a reciprocal relation’ (p. 62) that is
affective, fluid, ambiguous and sensual, and which demands an ethical responsi-
bility for and towards the other. What Schott hints at here goes right to the heart
of a feminist ethics, particularly as it is conceived postconventionally, and I would
have welcomed more detailed engagement with specific writers. Instead, the text
returns to a somewhat formulaic run-through on the strengths and weaknesses of
feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, and finally some postmodernism that
briefly engages with the corporeality of knowledge in the philosophy of Elizabeth
Grosz and Luce Irigaray, but it felt as though an opportunity to open up the
feminist debate had been missed.
The real strength of Schott’s work shines through, however, when she turns, in
the concluding sections, to a fuller discussion of ethics that abandons the overview
approach and deploys her own specific research interests. In Chapter 3, ‘Feminist
Ethics of Conflict’, Schott brings her whole discussion up to date by focusing her
reflections on ethics around the issues of war rape and sexual violence, particu-
larly with regard to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. She adopts a
deliberately ‘bottom-up’ context-dependent approach that, in asking how people
actually respect or break moral norms, involves a whole process of rethinking the
moral subject, moral knowledge and moral responsibility (pp. 88–9). Referring to
Simone de Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity, Schott maintains a typically postmod-
ernist paradox: that ‘Failure is immanent in the structure of human freedom, and
it is human failure that makes ethics meaningful’ (p. 94). This is a long way from
the usual fare of feminist ethics, and clearly marks Schott’s determination to move
beyond the expected. Her use of a phenomenological approach to the corporeal-
ity of experience similarly allows her to view ethics as an embodied relation that
inherently involves conflict and power differentials. When it comes to the need for
ethical repair, Schott considers and rejects the model of recognition, gives her
partial approval to the notion of witnessing – which she commends particularly
for its emotional depth – and finally opts for the ethics of alterity, which promotes
a thoroughgoing responsibility to and for the other that does not depend on
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achieving consensus. As Schott notes: ‘ethics includes phenomenological, insti-
tutional, and symbolic dimensions, even though this approach may be viewed as
trespassing boundaries between ethical and political analysis’ (p. 125). It is an alto-
gether sophisticated analysis that remains nonetheless easily accessible to the
reader.
As Schott ends her book with another reminder of the inequalities still facing
women in the world today, so Nagl-Docekal begins hers with an overview of
discrimination that gives the lie to the claim that we live in a post-feminist era.
Such a view, she remarks, is ‘a political-programmatic statement of a conservative
thrust rather than a descriptive proposition’ (p. xv). Having established the
continuing relevancy of the feminist project, she asks how philosophy has
contributed to and legitimized the hierarchy of the sexes, and how feminist phil-
osophy might develop alternatives that undermine existing asymmetries. To this
end, she promises a close textual reading of key passages, and a critical reassess-
ment of some of the central theses of feminist theory. Nagl-Docekal warns against
what she calls the ‘rhetorically overdrawn figures of dismissal’ (p. xx) that
permeate some forms of feminist thinking and attempt to put certain positions
beyond properly argumentative discussion. In pointedly naming ‘the death of the
subject’ or the constructivist notion of the body as just such positions, she signals
her own intention of reclaiming a modernist analytic that will look somewhat
sceptically on postmodernist alternatives. And so it proves.
Given a central concern with hierarchical gender relations as a point of organiz-
ation, Nagl-Docekal tackles successively philosophical anthropology, aesthetics,
reason and the philosophy of law to provide an increasingly politically engaged
summation of the task of feminist thinking. Her approach, however, is always
readily identified as that of a modernist philosopher, and some readers may find
her carefully reasoned style a little daunting. There is a certain formality to it that
may be unfamiliar to non-philosophers, and indeed it is part of Nagl-Docekal’s
remit to expose unchallenged dogma to such an analysis. In places, the outcome
is extremely lucid and easy to follow, but at times I began to feel somewhat
ground down. Unfortunately, my biggest problem was with the opening chapter,
‘On the Anthropology of the Sexes’, which among other things lays out an under-
standing of the concept of freedom that is essential to her subsequent argument.
While it is clear that Nagl-Docekal is well versed in poststructuralist and post-
modernist theory, she quickly establishes that her own commitments lie
elsewhere. Her treatment of the differential deployment by Butler and Grosz of
discursive materiality makes the sharp point that both perform an unproblema-
tized shift from an analytic approach to language to the ontological matter of the
production of sexual difference through discursive practices. Nagl-Docekal
remains unconvinced by the arguments of either and remarks that: ‘Juridical,
medical and disciplinary regulating norms, which are claimed to be the source of
what we consider natural facts, presuppose natural conditions. . . . Without the
question of how to deal with certain facts, there would not be any norms’ (p. 32).
Now, the logic of this objection, the structure of which Nagl-Docekal repeats in
various forms throughout her book, may be indisputable, but it is not clear to me
that Butler or Grosz would be substantially shaken by such an appeal to founda-
tions, given that her own approach is necessarily discursive. In an endnote, Nagl-
Docekal floats the idea that Butler’s inconsistencies – and how can we deny them?
– are part of a learning process, which would at least seem to me to signal a
properly feminist methodology on Butler’s part. Nonetheless, Nagl-Docekal
declines to follow through such an idea, and I can’t help feeling that she throws
the baby out with the bathwater.
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In the following chapter, the author provides an excellent assessment of
Freudian theory and the question of his biological determinism, before turning to
consider the feminist ploy of écriture féminine, which she finds both misleading
and inadequate. Once again, Nagl-Docekal is perhaps too literal in her approach
to the extent that her dislike of metaphor severely restricts her discussion, for
example, of ‘writing in white ink’ (p. 64). More than being a reference to the ‘femi-
ninity’ of breast milk, white ink is also about the invisibility of women, which is
a sociohistorical point well worth making. When it comes to Kant’s lapses in
rigour, however, Nagl-Docekal seems altogether more forgiving, sometimes with
convincing justifications, sometimes not. The value to me, however, is that her
approach did force me to recognize that feminist hostility to Kant is not always
well grounded, but often directed to a grossly oversimplified reading of his work.
Inevitably, it is in the chapter on reason that the author’s Kantian credentials are
most apparent, and in which her fuller critique of some of feminism’s favourite
theorists emerges. As she points out, we can only critique reason by appealing to
it: ‘any discussion of androcentric patterns of thinking requires, as a necessary
precondition, a capacity for reasonable reflection’ (p. 96). Nagl-Docekal insists that
she is not decrying the stimulation provided by many feminist theorists, but that
their rhetoric cannot stand up to properly constituted philosophical analysis. Her
argument is so carefully constructed that it is difficult to fault on its own terms,
but nonetheless it seems to me to devalue non-logical ways of thinking that may
yet produce indispensable shifts in how we understand gender hierarchies.
Perhaps we do need to be more aware of the incompleteness of much feminist
theory, but there is surely strength too in precisely that feature that always holds
open the questions rather than closing them down.
In her final section, Nagl-Docekal, in line with Schott’s approach, states clearly:
‘The ultimate aim of feminist philosophy . . . is to provide theoretical foundations
for a feminist politics’ (p. 133). She begins with a beautifully nuanced consider-
ation of Kant’s moral theory as it is based on the human capacity to choose our
own ends. Disappointingly for me, however, that potential is reduced to an appeal
to the value of contract theory as delivered via the law and through a revised defi-
nition of citizenship that takes the rights of women into account. It is a rather flat,
even abrupt conclusion that almost left me wondering whether some further
move in the original text had somehow been left out. In general it is hard for me
to agree with the development of Nagl-Docekal’s argument – it would involve
giving up too much that pushed my own thinking on – but she is too good an
analyst to ignore, and I hoped for a grander finale. Overall, then, my response was
very mixed. It is, admittedly, a long time since I was constrained to approach phil-
osophy like this, and my occasional impatience is unlikely to be shared by readers
who primarily avow the continuing value of modernist concepts and principles.
What doesn’t help, however, is a degree of infelicity in the translation itself, which
induces a somewhat heavy effect, though again I became most aware of it only at
points where I found the substantive argument difficult to follow. Nagl-Docekal
is undoubtedly a very fine philosopher who makes some telling points about the
dangers for feminism of less than rigorous thinking, and it seems a shame that her
editor did not iron out some of the unnecessary stylistic distractions.
Both these books are unusual as introductory texts. In referencing unfamiliar
continental feminist philosophers and relating their work to the accepted main-
stream, each is a potentially valuable addition to our resources, and Schott in
particular will have a strong transdisciplinary appeal. The difficulty with Nagl-
Docekal’s text lies perhaps in a certain negativity of tone, which will please those
fed up with sloppy postmodernist thinking, but is unlikely to win new converts
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to the Kantian tradition. In an ideal world there would be time to assimilate both,
but if I had to choose I guess that Schott will better engage the emerging philo-
sophical imagination.
Margrit Shildrick
Queen’s University Belfast
BATTLING THE BINARIES? REVISITING ‘HE, SHE AND IT REVISITED’
M. Lie, ed.
He, She and IT Revisited: New Perspectives on Gender in the Information Society
Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2003, 304 pp., ISBN 82–05–31550–7
Even in egalitarian Norway and despite various efforts by the Norwegian govern-
ment, private organizations, researchers and educators, a gender gap remains in the
design and use of computers and the Internet. This book collects recent work by
Norwegian scholars to achieve ‘a better understanding of how and if ICTs become
gendered and how they also may become “degendered” by both design and user
activities’ (p. 29). The main issue addressed in this book is the influence of the
hegemonic discourse of gender and ICTs on policy-makers, designers and users.
Although the sole focus on Norwegian researchers and Norwegian empirical
material is a narrow one for an edited book and, in this respect, the title is mislead-
ing, this book does present an important contribution to gender and ICT studies.
Norway is known for its high level of ICT penetration and the equality-oriented
politics of the government, which Norwegians call ‘state feminism’. Hence, an
investigation into the effectiveness of this politics may well provide insight into
the situation of other European countries. Moreover, Norwegian gender and ICT
researchers have built up an impressive, high-quality body of research that dates
back to the 1970s, making Norway one of the leading countries in gender and ICT
research from a social studies of technology and co-constructivist perspective.
In the chapter ‘Male Positioning Strategies in Relation to Computing’,
Corneliussen identifies the hegemonic discourse on gender and ICTs as follows:
experience, interest and knowledge of computers are expected of men, and men are
related to activities such as the ‘actual handling of the computer (technical
knowledge, software development) and activities related to play (computer games)’
(p. 110). This subject position is condensed in the image of the hacker. This is a
persuasive stereotype, which keeps girls and women away from computers as they
vigorously reject this style of life and compulsive way of engaging with technology.
Hence, the subject position that remains for, and is associated with women, is the
opposite of the hacker, a position of no special interest, experience or knowledge of
computers. For women, the computer is supposed to be ‘useful or a necessity, and
. . . the computer first and foremost is seen as a tool for concrete objectives’, e.g. for
the use of email and word-processing (p. 112). In all the chapters, it seems that
regardless of whether policy-makers, commercial firms and individual computer
users accept the myth (and most do), they have been influenced by it.
In the chapter ‘Forget the Hacker? A Critical Re-Appraisal of Norwegian
Studies of Gender and ICT’, Gansmo, Lagesen and Sørensen are interested in the
extent to which researchers themselves ‘may contribute to the conservation of
unfortunate symbolic practices related to the production of misleading gendered
dualisms’ (p. 37). Interestingly, perhaps one of the most important publications of
Norwegian researchers in the past did counter the hacker stereotype by showing
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